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COMMON LAW ACCOUNTING: THE CASE OF GOODWILL
ABSTRACT
This study is both conceptual and historical with regard to two institu-
tional systems in the United States for reaching social consensus on accounting
standards— the political alternative of statute law passed by Congress, and the
judicial alternative of common law adjudicated by the court. The first
section describes the two systems and the second section deduces from the
United States Constitution the hypothesis that common law is more efficient
for resolving issues of accounting as a language. The third section states
the null hypothesis and summarizes the methodology. From current accounting
textbooks a consensus core of 16 points is uncovered and assumed to be generally
accepted accounting principles for goodwill. The fourth section traces
these 16 elements of goodwill accounting back to their origin either under
common law adjudication before 1933 or under statute law legislation after
1933. The final section concludes that since 15 of the current 16 consensus
core points were formed under common law, the null hypothesis is rejected.

COMMON LAW ACCOUNTING: THE CASE OF GOODWILL
Recent research in jurisprudence and economics of law has refined
many legal concepts including property rights, contract, and tort.
With attention to both equity and efficiency, the refinements point
toward judicial institutions for handling a variety of problems now
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generally thought best assigned to regulatory agencies. This paper
first examines that perspective in considering the public choice
problem of designing an institution to set accounting standards, and
then looks closely at one example, accounting for goodwill.
One hope behind this paper is that it may help renew interest in
researching private law adjudication as an alternative to public law
regulation of accounting standards. (For a general comparison of the
two systems see Smith [1983].) A judicial solution to the institu-
tional problem of power to set accounting standards is not now seen by
most people as a practical alternative to a legislative solution. To
the best of my knowledge, accounting literature for several decades has
summarily disdained or implicitly dismissed the common law tradition
3for reaching consensus on accounting standards. This paper presents
4
a challenge to the present neglect of common law accounting.
-2-
The subject of this article is institutional alternatives. Since
the nature of a production process effects the nature of the product,
and since common law and statute law are very different processes, the
consequences are also likely to be very different. However, no attempt
will be made here to evaluate the elements of goodwill from any a priori
logical or theoretical perspective. The discussion of generally accepted
accounting principles for goodwill is limited to origins and changes in
the context of concern for institutional efficiency. I shall not con-
sider separately different kinds of efficiency (Tullock [1980]). Instead,
I shall presume that production efficiency (the process of creating law)
and control efficiency (the process of enforcing law) can be subsumed
with substantive efficiency (the content of law itself). I assume that
survival is an appropriate test of substantive efficiency.
The presentation is divided into four major sections and a conclu-
sion. The first section describes the fundamental institutions that
are likely alternatives for setting accounting standards in the United
States—namely, Congress and Court, the political and the judicial alter-
natives. The second section deduces from the United States Constitution
the expectation that common law is more efficient than statute law for
accounting. The third section extends the general expectation to
accounting for .goodwill and sets the stage, for a test of the null hypo-
thesis that in accounting for goodwill there is no efficiency difference
between the two institutions. The fourth section presents historical
evidence with summaries and comments on leading law cases. The final
section concludes that current neglect of common law and litigation is
not warranted.
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I. INSTITUTION ALTERNATIVES; CONGRESS V. COURT
Three fundamentally different formal institutions of government are
conceptually available for setting accounting standards. They are the
legislative, executive, and judicative functions corresponding to the
three separate agents in our federal system of limited and separated
powers—Congress, President, and Supreme Court. In some countries the
chief executive as (military?) dictator may dominate the representative
forum for making general statutes through majoritarian (or minority?)
politics. Similarly, a dictator may dominate the imperial forum for
judging conflicts between specific actors, involving events, customs,
statutes and constitution. In some countries a written constitution
may "guarantee" private rights, but that constitution may not be
available for citation in private litigation (Russia, for example).
Because the United States Constitution is available for citation in
private suits, and for many other reasons, a dictatorial President is
not likely to occur in the United States.
The so-called "independent" regulatory commissions (e.g., the
Securities and Exchange Commission) are often viewed as an essentially
different kind of institution, a fourth branch of government. But in
major respects that view is inaccurate. Commissions are merely dele-
gated mixtures of the three basic authorities to make law, to enforce
law, and to interpret law within a statutorily prescribed area. If
regulatory commissions were removed from oversight by the electoral
principal or from oversight by Congress, Court, or President, then com-
missions could, with radical independence, assume characteristics of
limited dictatorships. For many reasons, truly independent regulatory
commissions are unlikely in the United States.
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Since dictatorship by President or Commission is unlikely, Congress
and the Supreme Court are the legitimate formal alternatives for
reaching social consensus on accounting standards. The purpose of this
section is to summarize and to contrast two systems of law: the process
of legislating statute law and the process of judicating common law.
In the words of one legal scholar, "The basic assumptions entailed
by ... legislative fiat can be and often are quite different from those
entailed in ... law derived by reason from prior existing rules, prece-
dents, and principles. Legislation entails concepts of validity,
jurisdiction, sovereignty, democracy or general will, and- public good.
The law which has evolved through the system of the courts is based on
concepts of rationality, universality, rights, obligations, action,
responsibility, and agency" (Smith [1983, p. 73]).
The expression, "common law," is used here with a meaning wide
enough to encompass equity law as well. In England common law and
equity law developed separately in special courts. But under the
United States Constitution they were combined into one system. Ori-
ginally, common law courts looked on "property" as things owned, while
equity law courts looked on "property" as behavior claimed of other
people. This distinction survives today in accounting balance sheets.
The left side, assets, refers to things owned by the entity. The right
side, equities, refers to behavior claims by outsiders against the
entity. The consensus core meaning of "goodwill," to be developed in
Section Three, reflects both notions of property. However, that dis-
tinction need not be maintained for the purpose of this article. The
contrast of interest here is between judication and legislation. The
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expression, "statute law" is used here to mean more than laws passed by
Congress. It includes also regulations by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and pronouncements by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board. This wide interpretation is appropriate because the authority
exercised by both the SEC and the FASB is derived from Congressional
legislation.
Contrary to the misleading rhetoric that has been around for at
least half a century, the institutional conflict is not "public sector"
versus "private sector." Both of the fundamental alternatives involve
both private and public components (Johnson [1981, p. 101]). The pri-
vate component choice is between free experimentation and regulatory
compliance. The public component choice is between common law and sta-
tute law. The connecting links between private and public components
are lobbying under statute law and litigating under common law.
Statute Law
Statute law is the imperative of a sovereign will forced upon sub-
ject parties (Merryman [1969]). Statute law is older than common law,
and is traceable to at least ancient Rome. Statute law embodies
abstract notions of public good, abstract principles from which private
behavior must be deduced. Under threat of criminal penalty by the
sovereign, private behavior must conform to unconditional commands.
Statute law is like common law in this respect: both systems com-
bine private and public processes. The first stage of statute law is
the private process in which individuals campaign through elections
or war for sympathetic legislators and lobby to influence the passage
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of statutes favoring their private interests. Rhetoric in the politi-
cal process always justifies wealth-transferring statutes by alleging
"market failure," "need," and "public good." The rhetoric rarely
refers to non-market failure or to empirical comparisons of institu-
tions (Kalt [1981] and Wolf [1979]). Minority interests lose to the
larger vote. Legal duty that favors the majority coalition results in
a general policy of wealth redistribution and often places in jeopardy
the private rights of minority interests.
The second stage of statute law is the public process in which
legislation is passed and the administrative law judge functions as a
subordinate bureaucrat serving a regulatory regime (Merryman [1969]).
Statute law trials resemble a simple exercise in logic, a syllogism.
The major premise is found in the statute law code. It is assumed to
be right and true for otherwise it would not have been created. The
minor premise is found in the fact situation. The defendent is presumed
guilty, for otherwise he would not have been charged by the regulatory
commission. The defendent bears the burden of proving his innocence.
In the extreme case, the verdict may be reached by "inquisition," with
ideas of "public duty" overshadowing ideas of "private right." When
trials under statute law are over, the result is an extension of uni-
formity in complying with the statute which itself was never on trial
by the court (except for the rare' instance where a Constitutional ques-
tion of personal right against government is litigated).
Common Law
For nine centuries the courts in common law countries (first
England, and then primarily the United States, Canada, and Australia)
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have protected two kinds of expectations held by private parties:
expectations expressed in their private contracts and expectations
expressed in their "social contracts" or customary responsible behavior
on the part of a reasonable person exercising due care. When the 13
colonies formed a new and independent nation, they rebelled against the
legislative and executive powers of England, against Parliament and
King. They did not rebel against and did not overthrow their common
law heritage. In fact, the United States Constitution gave a more
important role to the judiciary because the Founding Fathers thought
the Court to be the branch of government least dangerous to freedom
(Bikel [1962]).
The judicial activity in common law is not only a quest for evi-
dence of specific "behavior by litigating parties—that is, for the
facts of the case—but also a quest for the relevant applicable law of
the case. Along with the defendent, the common law is continually on
trial (Bridewell and Whitten [1977, p. 12]). In this larger, dynamic
sense, "law" means much more than "statutes." Law is the ethics and
morality of the locale, or of the industry, or of some other social
scope such as accounting.
Custom is continuously evolving. Common law precedents cited by
counsel in court arguments are no more than evidence of customary
behavior, evidence of what the law is. Common law is a system whereby
custom is recognized through, but not created by, the judicial process.
Common law is created "in a vast and unpredictable universe of private
activity" (Bridewell and Whitten [1977, p. xiv]). Law is shaped by
history, tradition, culture, innovation, and practical considerations.
The results of this autonomous behavior are then formally accepted or
rejected through the public process of resolving specific conflict be-
tween parties in dispute.
In its purest form, common law case decision is a declaration of
what the custom would have been anyway without the declaration.
However, increasingly over the last century as all aspects of govern-
ment in the United States became larger and more intrusive, judges have
consciously gone beyond the optimal form of their role in common law
discovery. Judges now are said to "create" new laws through their
interpretative decisions.
The common law system was well described by Justice Redfield in
Atkinson v. Brooks [1854] . I paraphrase his original text in three
places by deleting his word "commercial" and replacing it with the word
"accounting." This paraphrase serves to emphasize one specific
instance of the general common law process. The other bracketed
material is my own addition.
The more important question growing out of the case is,
perhaps, what is the true [accounting] rule established upon
this subject? And it is of vital importance in regard to
[accounting] usages, that they should, as far as practicable,
be uniform throughout the world. And such is necessarily the
ultimate consideration and will inevitably be the final result.
It is, therefore, always a question of time as to uniformity
in such usages. The basis of such uniformity is convenience
and justice combined [i.e.?—economic efficiency and legal
equity? ] , and until such rules have become measurably settled
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by practice, they have to be treated as matters of fact, to
be passed upon by juries; and when the rule acquires the quality
of uniformity and the character of general acceptance, it is
then regarded as a matter of law. It is thus that [accounting]
law has grown up." (Atkinson v. Brooks [1854, p. 578])
Common law accounting is a pragmatic two-staete system for reaching
social consensus on standards. The first stage is private inquiry,
experimentation, discovery and choice between competing accounting
practices. The second stage is public inquiry through open trial and
judgment of the effects on specific parties in light of their expecta-
tions. Common law trial is a system of empirical research in which the
evidence is presented on record, under oath, and subjected to adversarial
cross examination. The dominate questions are: "Who has been or
likely will be harmed?", "How much harm was done?" and "Who did the
harm?" "What remedy is suitable?" The defendent is presumed innocent
until the plaintiff has proved him guilty of specific behavior that was
contrary to specific law. Neither individual "need" nor individual
"merit" are relevant to the case verdict of who did harm to whom and
what remedy is just. Common law cannot contemplate a general policy of
wealth redistribution, but only case-specific remedies, including com-
pensatory and punitive damages.
When a common law trial is over, the judge as impartial researcher
announces the conclusions as to both law and fact. The whole dynamic
pattern involves looking for consistencies and analogies from case to
case. The result is gradual improvement through rejection of generally
recognized unfair accounting practices. Thus the common law process is
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similar to both Karl Popper's "refutation" philosophy of science and
Friedrich Hayek's negative philosophy of social justice (Flanagan [1979,
p. 347]).
Accounting theory may be derived under common law from factual evi-
dence and legal precedent that continuously accumulate in all jurisdic-
tions. But these inductive inferences are never the subject of litiga-
tion and never reach the level of a priori truths. Instead, they remain
always secondary to practical experience. As Oliver Wendel Holmes said:
The life of the [common] law has not been logic; it has been
experience. . .and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics."
(Holmes [1881, p. 1])
Common law is essentially custom adopted through consent by private
parties exercising private rights. Under common law,
...a sovereign directive was simply not thought of as being
as important and significant in the solution of problems as
were the people to whom the rules were ultimately to apply
• and from whose orderly behavior, unmotivated by legislation
or judicial compulsion , the rules initially came." (Bridewell
and Whitten [1977, p. 97] emphasis added)
A blunt, but I think not overstated, polar contrast between statute
law and common law is the following. Statute law systematically empha-
sizes some ideological order in a process that results from, goes with,
and tends to cause bureaucratically administered wealth transfers.
Common law systematically emphasizes justice between enterprising pri-
vate parties in a process that results from, goes with, and tends to
cause a free society.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIORITY
With its limited and separated government functions, the United
States is constituted, more so than any other country, in a way that
allows peaceful experimentation seeking the "best" mixture of common
law and statute law processes for different social problems. For
accounting, this distinction between common law and statute law
acquires particular importance because one passage of the Constitution
conferring judicial power must be reconciled with two other passages
that together first confer and then constrict legislative power.
Judicial power is established by the Constitution in Article III.
Section 2 states in part: "Judicial power shall extend to all cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution" (emphasis added).
Congressional power is established in Article I. Section 8 paragraph 3
states in part: "Congress shall have Power... to regulate commerce with
foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes"
(emphasis added). Congressional power is then limited by the First
Amendment, which states in part: "Congress shall make no law. . .abridging
the freedom of speech" (emphasis added)
.
Various interpretations of these passages in the context of the
whole document, its formation and its history, become critical when
accounting is viewed as the language of business encompassed by the
terra "commercial speech." The expression "commercial speech" poses
uniquely the question of priority in construing the Constitution for
power to set accounting standards. (For an extended discussion of this
issue see Johnson [1981].)
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The First Amendment was adopted after the original text went into
effect as the fundamental law of the land. The amendment set a limit
to Congressional power to regulate. The limit prohibits statute law
to regulate speech.
The grammar of the Commerce Clause— " . .
.
shall have . . . "—is absolute
in conferring on Congress the power to regulate commerce of all kinds
without condition or exception. The grammar of the First Amendment is
equally absolute—"... shall make no ..."—in denying Congress power to
regulate speech of all kinds without condition or exception. The gram-
mar of Article III Section 2 is equally absolute—"... shall extend to
all..."—in conferring judicial power on the Supreme Court.
If strict construction of the Constitution is correct, if common
law adjudication is more efficient than statute law legislation for
matters of speech, if speech includes accounting as language, if
current goodwill accounting is reflected in textbook consensus, and if
relative efficiency can be inferred from the historical record, then
an examination of the origins and changes in accounting for goodwill
should lead to rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no effi-
ciency difference between the alternative fundamental institutions.
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III. Hypothesis and Methodology
After forming the conceptual arguments and general expectation
reported in Sections I and II, I did three things in strict sequence to
assure an impartial test of the hypothesis. First, I chose the account
title to be researched. Second, I uncovered the consensus about con-
stituent elements. Third, I explored the legal record. The test was
unbiased in this critical feature: prior to examining the court record,
and even prior to uncovering consensus on goodwill elements , I had only
an expectation but no factual knowledge of how much goodwill GAAP came
from common law and how much came from statute lav;. A strictly sta-
tistical null hypothesis would predict 50% from each institution.
For successful execution of the project, the account title had to
meet two requirements: presence and scope. As to presence, in order
for an institutional comparison to be made, the account title had to
be considered a problem under both common law and statute law. As to
scope, the title had to be broad enough that it would have a detailed
statement of generally accepted accounting principles in the textbooks,
and yet be narrow enough that it could be researched within reasonable
time and resource constraints. Intuitively goodwill seemed to fit both
requirements: neither too broad nor too narrow, and likely to have a
clear legal trail both before and after 1933, when the statutory era
began for accounting.
Since only one account title is dealt with here, this paper might
be considered a "case study." The weakest sort of case study is one in
which various levels of the experimental variable are manipulated by
the researcher in a context of weak situational variables. The strongest
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sort of case study is the polar extreme where, in a context of strong
situational variables, the experimental variable cannot be manipulated
by the researcher. I believe the research reported here is closer to
the strong polar case because the institutional alternatives were not
manipulable, and the situational variables (economic, political, and
private interests)- were likely to be strong. Future research may seek
to contradict or to reenforce this study using account titles other than
goodwill. As with all scientific studies, the conclusions here are con-
ditional.
In the second stage I examined current editions of eleven inter-
mediate financial accounting textbooks. I did not examine introductory
or advanced financial accounting textbooks or specialized textbooks on
cost accounting, managerial, systems, auditing, or tax. I assumed that
a consensus from intermediate textbooks would be an accurate statement
of generally accepted accounting principles for goodwill. I saw no
reason to believe that the consensus from intermediate textbooks would
be changed by the content of textbooks on other subjects.
None of the eleven textbooks presented any material on the institu-
tional origin of goodwill accounting. This general omission helped
insure an unbiased research procedure. The textbooks differed greatly
in many aspects of their goodwill discussion. Different points were
emphasized. Conceptual material was developed differently. Computa-
tional material was presented differently. Grammar and style varied.
But certain elements of accounting for goodwill were mentioned in all
eleven textbooks. Unanimously, goodwill is considered to be:
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(1) an asset
(2) not tangible
(3) not explicitly identifiable
(4) not separately transferable
(5) not explicitly valued
(6) associated with various causal factors
(7) estimable by various arithmetic procedures
(8) recorded only when purchased at historical cost
(9) transferred in conjunction with a whole business
(10) quantified as a residual (price paid minus fair market value
of separately disposable net assets)
(11) to be amortized over not more than 40 years
Five other points seem to be part of the goodwill meaning even
though not mentioned by all eleven textbooks. Goodwill is:
(12) developed over time
(13) not recorded as developed internally
(14) distinct from an agreement not to compete
(15) conceived as the expectation of excess profit
(16) associated with either equity or asset major acquisition.
Some other points were mentioned by only a few textbooks and seem
not to be part of a conceptual core meaning for goodwill. It is public
policy rather than the nature of goodwill that makes accounting reduc-
tion of goodwill not tax deductible. The adjustment procedures in con-
structing consolidated statements and working capital fund statements,
and the equity method of accounting for investments are secondary con-
siderations rather than primary features of goodwill. Finally, textbook
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onissions, errors of fact, and errors of interpretation are details
extraneous to the purpose of this article.
An operational definition of "element" in goodwill cannot be stated
clearly enough that other researchers could read these same textbooks
and necessarily infer exactly the same 16 points of consensus. The
distinction between "point" and "nonpoint" is not simply a question of
conceptual importance, or space, or taxonomic generality, or any other
hypothetical attribute of current goodwill GAAP. Anyway, the question
of significance is whether a different reading of goodwill core points
would give a different picture of institutional origins. In my opinion,
the difference would be slight and not of the kind to change the results,
In the third stage, I wanted to get a clear view of purely private
litigation and the common law system uncontaminated by statute law. I
focused on private disputes where private expectations were judged by
courts against the background of evolving business custom. Property
law, contract law, and tort law are essentially common law. At the
extreme, specific tort action may be unaffected in substance by statute
law. So I searched for cases of property, contract and tort action
where both plaintiff and defendent were private parties. I excluded
cases of tax, crime, regulation, probate, and bankruptcy where one
party was the government. Finally, since I wanted to stay close to
accounting as a language, I excluded cases involving the legal duty of
professional auditors. More than 1,000 cases with decision or dicta on
accounting were screened with these exclusionary criteria in mind. More
than 50 cases were identified for their seminal role in establishing
current goodwill GAAP. From these 50 private law cases I chose a few
leading ones to present in the next section.
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The textbook, consensus might have originated under either common
law or statute law. With the backing of Congress and the SEC, a few
small groups of . prof essional accounting practitioners, scholars, regu-
lators and legislators might have set all 16 points. The current con-
sensus might be a repudiation and reversal of earlier common law. A
finding that statute law had wholly repudiated common law would suggest
that the common law process was not a viable, effective and efficient
institution to set accounting standards. Such a finding would be
contrary to my expectation deduced from the Constitution.
On the contrary, the current consensus might be much older than the
SEC's statutory authority and have come entirely from common law. It
is possible that 50 years of statute law have added nothing to our
understanding of this "most complex, controversial, and misunderstood"
accounting topic. Nothing will have been added by the statutory era if
the regulators have only codified extant common law. A finding that
goodwill GAAP is wholly derived from common law would suggest that com-
mon law is in fact as well as in theory a viable institution to set
accounting standards.
The cases summarized here as well as prior court precedents cited
in them include a variety of causes and a variety of remedies. Private
legal action was based on claims of tortious behavior in fraud, mis-
representation, conversion of property, and unfair competition; breach
of contract to buy or sell real estate, other assets, or common stock
equity; to operate a business; to form or to terminate a partnership or
a corporation; to share profits, to pay interest; to distribute dividends;
to refrain from competition, etc. Remedies sought by the plaintiffs
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included specific contract performance; contract rescission; recovery
of sold goods; recovery of purchase price; damages; and injunction.
Some cases were decided on the merits of evidence and substantive law.
Some cases were decided on legal procedures, such as estoppel, laches,
standing to sue, jury instruction error, and evidence admissibility.
But even in cases decided on procedural grounds, judges could and did,
in. dicta, contribute to the common law development of consensus on
accounting standards for goodwill. Collectively these cases create
general purpose accounting principles.
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IV. Evaluation of Goodwill Accounting
The previous sections dealt conceptually with alternative institu-
tions, deduced the expectation of efficiency in common law accounting,
and stated the null hypothesis that there is no efficiency difference
between common law and statute law for setting standards of accounting
for goodwill. This section presents the historical record. It. contains
summaries and comments on leading court cases that helped to establish
the precedents that are today incorporated by consensus in intermediate
accounting textbooks as generally accepted accounting principles for
goodwill. In addition to summarizing the cases, I shall also identify
some of the alternative accounting concepts and procedures that were
rejected, explicitly or implicitly, by the court decisions and dicta.
Cases and Comments
Broad v. Jollyfe, 1620, England .
The plaintiff, a mercer, was awarded damages for breach of an
implied contract. Although the term "goodwill" was not used, the con-
text makes unavoidable the concept of goodwill as an asset. The plain-
tiff had paid three hundred pounds for an entire stock of old textiles.
The inventory had a fair market value of no more than one hundred
pounds. The two hundred pound difference received by the defendent was
in consideration of his voluntary but unwritten promise not to continue
his mercer trade in the same shop location. In effect he sold the
business assets and goodwill. However, rather than close his shop
as promised, the defendent reopened it with new wares, thus depriving
the plaintiff of customers expected in his nearby shop.
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The alternatives implicitly rejected by this decision were: (1)
only tangible property can be owned; (2) promises and expectations can
not be sold in conjunction with a transfer of tangible property; (3)
the law will not protect property rights of this intangible nature.
Cruttwell v. Lye, 1810, England
The plaintiff, an entrepreneur carrier of waggon trade over a cer-
tain route, was denied an injunction against the defendent who, having
sold his bankrupt business to the plaintiff, subsequently reentered the
carrying trade between the same terminal cities but at different ware-
houses and over a different route. In refusing to grant the injunc-
tion, Lord Chancellor Eldon defined goodwill as "...nothing more than
the probability that the old customers will resort to the old place"
[emphasis added] . The court held that the defendent had not reentered
the same trade.
The alternatives implicitly rejected were: (1) only actualities
and not probabilities of this kind may be exchanged under legal
enforcement; (2) the vendor of goodwill is totally barred by contract
from seeking new customers in a new place of similar business.
Austen v. Boys, 1858, England
In a complicated case of partnership dissolution, the court held
that where a trade is established in a particular place, "goodwill"
means nothing more than "the sum of money which any person would be
willing to give for the chance of being able to keep the trade con-
nected with the place where it has been carried on. Goodwill is
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something distinct from the profits of a business, although in deter-
mining its value, the profits are necessarily taken into account, and
it is usually estimated at so many years' purchase upon the amount of
those profits." However, the term "goodwill" seems "wholly inappli-
cable to the business of a solicitor, which has no local existence, but
is entirely personal...."
The alternatives implicitly rej ected were: (1) goodwill can be
quantified in money terms apart from an arras length purchase; (2) good-
will can be associated with a form of wealth ownership that cannot be
exchanged under legal enforcement (i.e., human capital).
Churton v. Douglas, 1859, England
The plaintiff was granted an injunction against his former partner,
the defendent who had sold to the plaintiff his interest, including
goodwill, in a merchant business. The court said the vendor of good-
will was at liberty to set up precisely the same business next door to
the old place. The injunction barred the vendor from doing business
under the old style or firm name. In the court opinion, Vice
Chancellor Wood defined goodwill very broadly as "...every positive
advantage. . .whether connected with the premises in which the business
was previously carried on, or with the name of the firm, or with any
other matter carrying with it the benefit of the business."
The alternatives explicitly rejected were: (1) the sale of good-
will implies per se a contract by the vendor to transfer both positive
and negative advantages, the latter being an agreement not to compete;
(2) goodwill is associated with only certain tangible assets, such as
location.
Mellersh v. Keen, 1860, England
The court held that on principle, in a partnership dissolution,
goodwill should be valued, at the hypothetical amount of money it would
have produced if sold in an arms-length transaction in the most advan-
tageous manner at the most proper time. In this case, goodwill of a
banking partnership was assessed at one years purchase of the average
profits for the past three years.
The alternative rejected was that goodwill could be accurately
valued via a private, bilateral, non-market price, negotiated in a
manner such that only one partner obtains the benefit. (Or, in other
words, the court rejected the idea that goodwill was an asset of the
partners rather than an asset of the partnership.)
Bell v. Ellis, 1867, California
In this case of fraud and replevin following a bankruptcy action,
the court extended the decision in Cruttwell v. Lye, 1810. Goodwill
"...is the probability that the business will continue in the future as
in the past, adding to the profits of the concern and contributing to
the means of meeting its engagements [i.e., debts] as they come in..."
[and] must be taken into accounting in determining..." solvency. This
opinion also quoted Justice Story's textbook definition of "goodwill"
which would come to dominate American jurisprudence. Goodwill is
"...the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment
beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed
therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encourage-
ment which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account
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of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or
affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances, or
necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices."
The alternative explicitly rejected was a narrow, tangible, net
asset position statement for determining solvency and thereby for
valuing goodwill.
Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 1893, U.S. Supreme Court
The plaintiff was denied his request that the defendent be forced
to sell goodwill in order to pay its mortgage. The court said goodwill
"is tangible only as an accident, as connected with a going concern or
business having locality or name, and is not susceptible of being
disposed of independently. As applied to a newspaper, the goodwill
usually attaches to its name rather than to the place of publication.
The probability of the title continuing to attract custom in the way of
circulation and advertising patronage, gives a value which may be pro-
tected and disposed of, and constitutes property."
The alternatives explicitly rejected are: (1) goodwill is sepa-
rately disposable; and (2) being separately disposable, sale of good-
will by itself can be forced by the court to satisfy debt claims.
Washburn et al v. National Wall Paper Co., 1897, U.S. Second Circuit
The defendent corporation had issued common stock in payment for
the goodwill of several acquired businesses, and simultaneously had
issued cumulative preferred debentures in payment for the net tangible
assets. The plaintiffs were large stock owners of the defendent cor-
poration who sought an injunction against payment of interest expense
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on the debentures. Determining the value of the goodwill purchased
with stock was critical for determining whether payment of interest
would, contrary to state statute and Co corporate by-laws, impair
corporate capital. In dismissing the plaintiff's petition, the court
said that goodwill was property actually received by the defendent in
exchange for common stock; and that subsequent closing of some estab-
lishments did not prove depreciation of goodwill (and thereby capital)
when the customers are supplied by other establishments.
The alternatives rej ected were: (1) goodwill is not property
actually transferred; and (2) goodwill is indissolubly connected with
a particular locality or specific tangible property rather than with
the continuing business.
Von au v. Magenheimer, 1908, New York
Charging fraud, the plaintiff said she was induced to sell her
stock to officers of a close corporation, the defendents, after being
told that the company had such large losses it would never be able to
pay more than a 3% dividend. As remedy for the injustice, the court
awarded damages rather than rescind the contract. In calculating the
amount of loss to the plaintiff as a result of the fraudulent sale, the
court said that the value of goodwill is a question of fact for the
jury to decide. Evidence of company business subsequent to the fraudu-
lent sale was admitted for determining goodwill at the time of sale..
The jury found that goodwill was worth six times excess profits, after
deducting a normal six percent return on equity from annual earnings.
The alternatives rejected were: (1) the value .of goodwill is a
matter of law rather than of fact; (2) actual balance sheet information
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is not relevant for comparison and calculation of what goodwill was at
an earlier time; and (3) goodwill is valued in relation to normal pro-
fits.
Coleman v. Booth, 1916, Missouri
The plaintiff was trustee in bankruptcy of a paper company. The
board of directors had by resolution on more than one occasion
increased both the amount of "goodwill" asset and the amount of
"undivided surplus" equity, thus concealing deficits. They then paid
dividends based on the revised balance sheets. The defendent testified
that the "...undivided surplus account was a flexible account that we
charged or credited to, to make trial balances come out every time
right." The court did not hold that it was per se fraud to record
internally developed goodwill, but "...there was absolutely no excuse
f or. .. [booking goodwill] when the company first commenced doing busi-
ness, and when it had established no reputation which entitled it to
any such asset." Directors individually were found liable to creditors
for the amount of illegal dividends.
The alternative rejected was that non-purchased goodwill may be
recorded at the time a firm is first organized.
Hodde v. Hahn et al. , 1920, Missouri
The receiver of a bankrupt oil corporation sued to recover unpaid
stock subscriptions arising from an earlier merger involving goodwill
of a mercantile firm received in exchange for stock in the surviving
entity. The evidence showed that some accounts receivable existing
prior to the merger had after merger been charged to goodwill.
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According to an expert accountant witness, not only had there been a
total loss since the merger, but at the time of bankruptcy assets were
less than liabilities. The court said that a company's goodwill "can
only be estimated by the results of its business operations from the
time it commences until it ceases.... If in consequence of general
public patronage such declared [goodwill] advantage or benefit turns
out to be a disadvantage and a loss, then the goodwill becomes nothing
more than a purely imaginary quantity, neither "the substance of things
hoped for nor the evidence of things not seen." The court ruled that
the stock subscriptions had not been paid because sufficient goodwill
had not existed at the time of merger. Original stockholders had to
make good the purchase price even though they had sold their shares
after merger and before bankruptcy.
The alternatives rej ected were: (1) subjective assertions about
the future are determinate evidence; (2) as a matter of fact a bankrupt
firm can have goodwill.
Mills v. Rich, 1930, Michigan
The plaintiff was an employee with a contract for sharing profits
and also sharing book value when employment ceased. The plaintiff
claimed that he was entitled to be compensated for his share of the
firm's goodwill developed during his employment. The court said,
"Goodwill is based upon the prospective hypothetical profits to result
from voluntarily continued patronage of the buying public... The book
value of a business is based upon the actual cost.... No goodwill was
set up on the books of the company... No claim is made the books were
not correct." So the plaintiff's claim was denied.
-27-
The alternative rejected was that the books of a company must
include internally developed goodwill in order to be correct.
-28-
V. Conclusion
As summarized in Table 1, 15 of the textbook consensus points on
goodwill (94%) emerged under common law through private litigation.
This is a clear rejection of a strictly statistical null hypothesis.
Since the entire population of goodwill elements was examined, no prob-
ability inference or confidence interval is appropriate. Alternatively,
if the population being researched here were all of the account titles
for which discrete component elements could be used to compare institu-
tional origins, then goodwill would be a judgmental, statistically non-
random, sample of one from which no statistical inference about the
whole population would be warranted. However, the alternative expected
hypothesis of common law efficiency is not rejected in this case of
goodwill accounting.
To use a metaphor, the proposition that "All crows are black" can
be refuted by the discovery of a single white crow. If the two color
categories, black and non-black, are defined at the 50% margin, and if
94% of the feathers on one crow are white, then at least we have in good-
will one white crow. This clearly refutes the dominant impression that
all current GAAP emerged from statutory authority (see footnote #3).
Six of the leading goodwill cases (50%) were decided during 1893-
1933, the last four decades of common law prior to the statutory era.
There was continual refinement of goodwill with six of the consensus
points (38%) being decided in the final 40 years of judicial supremacy.
In contrast, during nearly five decades under statute law only
one of the 16 consensus points (6%) was established. Point #11, that
goodwill must be amortized over not more than 40 years, is the only
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repudiation of common law goodwill accounting precedent that I found.
One exceptional case which might be interpreted as anomlous was
McFadden v. Jenkins [1918]. The court there recognized the possibility
that even a firm losing money could have goodwill as an asset. This
view is contrary to Hodde v. Hahn [1920] and has not been followed.
None of the other 15 consensus points of goodwill came as a statu-
tory reversal of common law precedent. The absence of reversals must
be interpreted, at least tentatively, as a statutory acknowledgement
that the common law process can be substantively efficient.
Under common law the value of goodwill was a matter of fact to be
discovered in each individual case by evidence under adversarial cross
examination. This recognition of diversity in fact situations is re-
flected in many case decisions, such as: Von au v. Magenheimer [1908],
where the value of good will was a question of fact, not a question of
law; Davenport v. Lines
,
[1899], where goodwill was not allowed as an
asset; Goodnow v. American Writing Paper
,
[1908], where goodwill did
not have to be amortized; Lane v. Barnard
,
[1918], where goodwill
should continue to be carried on the books; and Lane v. Barnard
, [1919],
where a very rapid writeoff may be appropriate.
Dominant pressure under statute law for uniformity led to the con-
version of matters of fact (i.e., life and therefore unamortized
values) into law (i.e., time limit of one to fourty years). Would
Judge Redfeld, in light of his 1854 opinion (Atkinson v. Brooks [p. 578])
think that APB//17 was a hasty or a tardy freezing of custom? The answer
depends on three conditions: (1) whether the "basis of such uniformity
is convenience [economic efficiency] and justice [legal equity]"; (2)
-30-
whether by 1970 the one-to-forty-years rule had "become measurably
settled by practice"; and (3) whether the rule had acquired "the quality
of uniformity and the character of general acceptance" such that it was
already regarded as a matter of common law.
Was APB//17 merely a formal recognition of custom, or was it a major
limitation on practice? The answer would depend on lobbying and liti-
gating after 1933, a time period not examined in this research. Briefly
stated, ARB #24 [1944] said that amortization was not obligatory; ARB
#43 [1953] condemned arbitrary lump-sum writeoff and required an event
to indicate goodwill loss; APB #17 [1970] required amortization over not
more than 40 years.
The score thus far on accounting standards for goodwill is 15 to 1
for a strict interpretation of the Constitution, for judication over
legislation, for Courts over Congress, for litigating over lobbying.
That score seems to refute the claim that common law is an inefficient
system. The record gives an empirical challenge to the prevalent belief
that, for reaching consensus on accounting standards, statutory regula-
tion is more efficient than private litigation. It remains to be seen
whether this challenge can be sustained by further research.
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Footnotes
It is an understatement to say that recent contributions to know-
ledge through micro-economic analysis of legal concepts are too numerous
to mention. Most of the research has been the result of Ronald Coase's
classic article, "The Problem of Social Cost" [I960]. Also of classic
importance has been Richard Posner's book, Economic Analysis of Law
[1973, 1977]. For a recent overview of the field see the Hofstra Law
Review (Spring, 1980) which contains the proceedings of the "Symposium
on Efficiency as a Legal Concern."
2
Two of the best sources of this vast literature are issues of the
Journal of Law and Economics [1958 to the present] and the Journal of
Legal Studies [1974 to the present] . One of the best single coverages
is Posner, The Economics of Justice [1981]
.
3
Frequent neglect of a comprehensive philosophical and historical
perspective on institutional matters has led to errors and omissions.
Noteworthy examples that emphasize the political nature of legislation,
but omit the judicial nature of common law standard setting, include
the following: Wheat Committee [1972], Horngren [1973], Gerboth
[1973], Beaver and Demski [1974], Johnson and Gunn [1974], May and
Sundem [1976], Sterling [1977], Watts and Zimmerman [1978 and 1979],
Dopuch and Sunder [1980],
Citing the Wheat Committee report chapter entitled, "A Threshold
Question: Should the Board Be Public or Private?" [p. 21] , Sterling
said:
Thus, the choice between governmental legislation
and private legislation is a threshold question and
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a question which overshadows all others. No other
alternatives were perceived by the Wheat Committee
or in the main theme of the literature which had
preceded it. [p. 256]
Even though Sterling went on to predict the establishment of a
special court, he foresaw its function to be "adjudicating disputes
about alternative interpretations of the statutes [p. 265], rather
than putting the statute per se on trial as would be the case under
common law.
In a similar vein, Dopuch and Sunder cited the proposal by A. C.
Littleton [1935] for an accounting court. In their award winning
article they asked:
Is this [making compromise decisions to appease con-
flicting interests] not a function similar to that
performed by the courts, and if so, are we now back
to the proposal for an accounting court. [1980, p. 19]
However, Dopuch and Sunder did not mention that Littleton's pro-
posal would have placed the accounting court inside the SEC. Such a
subordination of justice to administrative bureaucracy would be in
keeping with European civil law. But it would be at odds with United
States tradition of an independent judiciary. Furthermore, in my opi-
nion, to place a court inside a regulatory commission would violate the
separation of powers provision of the United States Constitution.
Perhaps the most telling failure to consider common law was
Johnson and Gunn [1974], Writing about conflict resolution, they
tacitly accepted the present system for legislating standards. They
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failed to note that an inevitable corollary to the market in the United
States is common law, private litigation, and court adjudication to set
accounting standards.
Ever since the SEC was formed in 1934, the "public-versus-private"
dichotomy has misguided debate on design of the institution for setting
accounting standards. In their first award winning article, Watts and
Zimmerman made no reference to common law judication. They wrote:
Accounting standards in the United States have re-
sulted from a complex interaction among numerous
parties including agencies of the Federal govern-
ment (notably the Securities and Exchange Commission
and Treasury Department) , state regulatory commis-
sions, public accountants, quasi-public accounting
standard setting Boards... and corporate manage-
ments. [1978, p. 112]
.
This recitation of five component groups omits the court system
that formally constitutes the common law system. Watts and Zimmerman
focused on lobbying activity in developing their "positive" theory of
the determination of accounting standards. Their theory can be at
best only a partial theory for the United States because it does not
include litigating as well as lobbying.
Again in their second award winning article, Watts and Zimmerman
made no reference to common law. In reference to an "unregulated
economy," they claimed that accounting prescriptions were usually
based on rationalization of practice [1979, p. 298]. To the contrary,
I would argue that prior to statutory law, accounting prescriptions
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were in fact based on judgment cases of private litigation even though
accounting authors might have ignored the role of common law process
in determining accounting standards. Watts and Zimmerman wrote, that
"self interest theories are politically unpalatable..." [1979, p.
301] , and proponents of different standards develop public interest
arguments (excuses) that need not be true to cover their self interest
motives. Under common law judication to set accounting standards,
self-interest is both necessary and openly expected as part of the
litigating process. Private interest testimony is on record, under
oath, exposed for rebuttal and explicitly subject^to adversarial cross
A
examination. In my opinion, self-interest motives clothed in public
interest theories are more likely to go undetected in a political
system of lobbying legislation than in a judicial system of litigious
adjudication.
Finally, it seems incorrect to assert that "Common law and common
accounting... can yield to legislative power without loss of esteem."
(Hills [1957, p. 3.]) In my opinion, much more than esteem has been
lost during the past 50 years of statutory law setting accounting stan-
dards.
V
4
Publications on the law of accounting have generally been only
narrative, categorical and descriptive, for example Hills [1957] , Simon
[1965], and Courtis [1983]. I have not found an example of hypothesis
testing of fundamental institution alternatives for accounting.
See Karlin [1983] and Smith [1983] for a good introduction to con-
trasts between the two systems. The following sources are particularly
instructive: Holmes [l88l] , Pollack £l912] , Commons [19*4] , Clark [/93>],
T*Hgy Dietze £2.973] , Chlorus [l978] , Calabresi [l982] , Rubin [1982] ,
and Elliott [l984] .
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Allegations of market failure, need, and public good are alwavs
present in law cases involving regulation, from Munn v. Illinois [1877],
through Lochner v. New York [1905] and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
[1937], to whatever case is now being argued. These arguments in the
judicial arena reflect as well as ignite the political rhetoric.
My list of eleven intermediate financial accounting textbooks came
from the cover of a book which contained the proceedings of a conference
on "The Impact of Rule-Making on Intermediate Financial Accounting Text-
books" [Jensen [1982]). The textbooks were: Chasteen, et al [1984],
Danos and Imhoff [1983], Davidson, et al (3rd ed) [1982], Edwards, et al
[1981], Ellis and Thacker [1980], Kieso and Weygandt [1983], Miller,
et al [1982], Mosich and Larson (5th ed) [1982], Nikolai, et al [1981],
Smith and Skousen (7th ed) [1981], and Welsch, et al [1982].
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